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Despite third parties being important conduits of trust, little is known about the mechanisms and
conditions relevant to their influence on trust formation and partner selection in interfirm relationships.
In this study, we experimentally examine how varying levels of third-party information shape the trust
that buyer managers have in a potential supplier firm, and how this trust affects subsequent selection
decisions. In addition, we investigate when this information is most influential, by accounting for the
moderating impact of the focal firm’s own prior experience. As expected, both neutral and favorable
third-party information are able to elicit trust, yet with different effects on competence and goodwill
trusting beliefs. These trusting beliefs, in turn, are positively associated with the likelihood of the sup-
plier to be selected. Notably, we find third-party effects over and above the effects resulting from own
prior experience. Overall, by investigating differences with regard to the origin and content of infor-
mation and the specific type of trust, this study advances a more nuanced understanding of the partner
selection process.
© 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Studies on the role of management control in mitigating the
risks of interfirm relationships suggest that, alongside formal
governance and control structures, appropriate partner search and
selection is critical for the effective management and success of
these relationships (e.g., Dekker, 2008; Dekker & Van den Abbeele,
2010; Ding, Dekker, & Groot, 2013; Mahama & Chua, 2016). The
decision-making process associated with selecting a collaboration
partner, however, is complex and challenging, especially given the
high level of uncertainty and risk associated with entering new
partnerships. At relationship inception, performance risk and
relational risk are the two primary types of risk that need to be
considered (Das & Teng, 2001; Langfield-Smith, 2008). Whereas
performance risk results from uncertainties about the partner’s
performance, relational risk results from exposure to the partner’s
potential opportunistic behavior. This brings about the relevance of
two trust dimensions, relating to the partner’s competencies on the
one hand, and the partner’s reliability or goodwill on the other
hand (e.g., Anderson, Chang, Cheng, & Phua, 2017; Das & Teng,tof.stouthuysen@vlerick.com
uysen, K., Trust transfer and p
9.1010812001; Dekker, Sakaguchi, & Kuwai, 2013; Langfield-Smith, 2008).
For the selection process, this implies that evaluation on these di-
mensions is important.
As has been long contended in the network literature, relevant
information on the competencies and reliability of potential part-
ners originates, in part, from third parties (e.g., Baum, Rowley,
Shipilov, & Chuang, 2005; Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). In particular,
other firms’ dealings with a partner constitutes an important in-
direct channel of information that can be used to evaluate that
partner, and to predict the partner’s performance and behavior in
future interactions. Yet, while accounting scholars have speculated
about how third parties may serve as trust intermediaries (e.g.,
Ding et al., 2013; Mahama & Chua, 2016), no research to date has
modeled and directly assessed the effect of third-party information
on the emergence of trust and subsequent partner selection within
an interfirm setting. In addition, there exists limited insight into
how information originating from third parties interrelates with
information from own prior experience. This study seeks to address
these gaps and, by doing so, to improve our understanding of the
partner selection process.
The study draws on current theoretical understandings of trust
cues that are important for interfirm partnering and particularly
examines trust transfer as a means for establishing trust. Our focus
is on a buyer manager’s trust in a potential supplier firm during theartner selection in interfirm relationships, Accounting, Organizations
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and potentially selected. The basic premise behind trust transfer in
this context is that, other than based on own prior experience with
the supplier, buyer managers’ initial trust impressions are based on
the cues provided by third parties, such as other buyer firms.
Importantly, however, we argue that third-party influence var-
ies depending on the information content brought by these third
parties and the particular type of trust. A crucial difference in the
informational signals stemming from third parties lies in whether
the outcomes of third-party dealings are known or not. While prior
studies mainly suggest that information about the outcomes of
other firms’ dealings can contribute to perceptions of the partner’s
trustworthiness (see also, Barrera& Buskens, 2007; Stewart, 2003),
specific outcome information may not always be available. In many
instances, one can observe the behavior of other trustors, while
their payoffs remain unknown.1 This invokes the question of
whether the mere knowledge of other firms’ dealings, without any
information about the outcomes, is sufficient to elicit trust.
Therefore, besides situations in which decision-makers are
informed about the outcomes obtained by other firms from dealing
with the partner, this study also investigates trust problems in
which information available is less specific. We further differentiate
between the competence and goodwill dimensions of trust, each
dimension reflecting a unique perceptual perspective from which
managers consider a potential partner, for which third-party in-
formation is expected to be differentially informative. In order to
more completely grasp the impact of third-party information, we
also account for the opportunity of learning from one’s own past
dealings with the partner, based on the assumption that this
changes managers’ informational needs and modifies their reliance
on third parties.
In our experiment, participants assume the role of a buyer
manager in charge of handling collaborative relationships with
supplier firms, with information from own firm experience and
from third parties being manipulated respectively, in order to
assess whether this would influence the level of, both competence
and goodwill, trust and, in turn, the likelihood to select. Regarding
third-party information, we compare two conditions where infor-
mation is provided about other firms’ prior dealings with a po-
tential supplier, varying the completeness of information by either
excluding or including obtained outcomes, to a control condition
where no such information is presented. In addition, we examine
whether responses to third-party information differ depending on
whether positive own firm experience is present, as an alternative
information source, or not.
The primary contribution of this study to the accounting liter-
ature is an increased understanding of the role of third-party in-
formation, distinguishing between relatively neutral (i.e., excluding
outcomes) and more specific, pointed information (i.e., including
outcomes), in establishing trust and influencing subsequent part-
ner selection. We show that third-party information, depending on
its content, triggers different effects on competence and goodwill
trusting beliefs. Specifically, the results reveal that simply knowing
other firms that trusted the supplier, without any information
about the outcomes, is sufficient for the participants’ level of
competence trust in the supplier to increase. This provides evi-
dence for trust transfer even while excluding a reinforcement
statement, namely, that it would lead to desirable outcomes. The1 For example, from company webpages, press releases or more specific channels
such as supplier discovery platforms, one can easily acquire information about
potential suppliers’ past and current business relationships. While this information
reveals something about the extent to which other firms have trusted the supplier,
the precise outcomes of these dealings are not publicly available.
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only found to increase when it is known that other firms had good
outcomes, and thus the supplier proved to be trustworthy.
Altogether, our findings illustrate that the informational basis on
which competence trust and goodwill trust are built is not neces-
sarily the same, although both are shown to be important criteria in
partner selection. With this, the study responds to prior research
that has called for a more detailed understanding about the ante-
cedents and consequences of trust (e.g., Anderson et al., 2017;
Dekker, Sakaguchi,& Kawai, 2013), as it unravels the process of how
information from third parties affects partner selection through the
formation of specific trusting beliefs.
By considering the moderating role of direct learning from own
experience, this study also sought to shedmore light onwhen third-
party information is most influential for partner selection. In
contrast to prior research that has suggested a substitutional rela-
tionship between prior partner experience and the search for in-
formation (e.g., Baum et al., 2005; Dekker & Van den Abbeele,
2010), we do not find that information from own experience
weakens the effect of third-party information on the formation of
trust. Instead, results indicate that even for buyer managers who
are able to rely on their firm’s own prior experiences, third-party
information is conducive to the perceptions they hold regarding
the supplier’s trustworthiness, and influences selection decisions
accordingly.
Given the common challenges in partner search and selection,
this study is also relevant for business practice. As current cus-
tomers are among the most influential information sources in
choosing vendors and business partners alike, this study demon-
strates that decision-makers indeed value third-party information
as a critical part of their search, evaluation, and decision-making
process. Drawing on these insights, there is a clear opportunity
for supplier firms to leverage their relationships with third parties.
The results of our study not only suggest that displaying informa-
tion about previous partnerships is a worthy trust-building tactic,
but also points up the potential of activating satisfied partners and
connecting them with prospective buyers as to promote trust
transfer. If done effectively, suppliers are more likely to be seen as
trustworthy, creating a competitive edge when it comes to partner
selection.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We first discuss the
theoretical background and develop the hypotheses. We next
describe the experiment and report the results. The final section
concludes.
2. Theory and hypotheses
2.1. Trust in interfirm relationships
Interfirm relationships involve interdependence and firms and
their managers must, therefore, depend on others in various ways
to accomplish their organizational goals. Several theories have
emerged that describe mechanisms for minimizing the risk
inherent in such arrangements. Most of these theories, such as
transaction cost theory, focus on the design of appropriate con-
tracts as an important governance mechanism. However, as a
consequence of complexity and uncertainty, it is usually not
feasible to lay down each party’s obligations completely and
unambiguously in advance, and so most contracts are incomplete
(Krishnan, Miller, & Sedatole, 2011; Vosselman & Van der Meer-
Kooistra, 2009). Since it is impossible to manage all vulnerabil-
ities through enforceable contracts, firms and their managers rely
on trust to facilitate cooperation (Dekker, 2004; Emsley & Kidon,
2007; Sako, 1992).
Following prior literature, we define trust as a psychologicalartner selection in interfirm relationships, Accounting, Organizations
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positive expectations about themotivations or behaviors of another
(Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, &
Camerer, 1998). Based on this notion, trust is often referred to as
the perception formed by one party about another party’s trust-
worthiness. Early research on interfirm trust posits that the
perceived likelihood that the other party will be trustworthy is
based on judgments about its competencies and goodwill (Das &
Teng, 2001; Nooteboom, 1996). Specifically, in line with prior ac-
counting and information systems research (e.g., Anderson et al.,
2017; Nicolaou, Sedatole, & Lankton, 2011), we consider trust as
the belief that the other party has beneficial characteristics, and
implies favorable perceptions about the exchange partner’s com-
petencies (i.e., has the ability to do what the partner needs done),
integrity (i.e., is honest and keeps commitments), and benevolence
(i.e., is responsive to the partner’s interests, not just its own).
Combined, perceptions of competence entail attributions regarding
the ability of the other party, while perceptions of goodwill entail
attributions regarding the integrity and benevolence of the other
party. Hence, our definition of interfirm trust encompasses not only
concerns about a partner’s ability to perform according to agree-
ments, but also its intentions to do so.2 Positive expectations along
these dimensions provide the foundation for one’s willingness to
accept vulnerability (McEvily, Perrone, & Zaheer, 2003; Vosselman
& Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009), which, at the partner selection
stage, implies the willingness to engage and to collaborate with a
specific partner.
The interfirm literature points out that trust can exist at mul-
tiple levels between individuals and/or firms (e.g., Currall& Inkpen,
2002; Velez, Sanchez, & Alvarez-Dardet, 2008). We focus on the
initial trust placed by an individual buyer manager in a potential
supplier firm. More specifically, this study concentrates on the in-
ferences that buyer managers make about a potential supplier firm
using relevant information to develop perceptions of trust, upon
which the decision regarding partner selection will then be based.
In the next section, we elaborate on this information-based
perspective and introduce the concept of trust transferability as
the theoretical background of our study.2.2. The notion of trust transfer and informed partner selection
In many cases, the paucity of information about the compe-
tencies and reliability of potential partners creates a significant
informational hurdle for managers that consider entering interfirm
relationships (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). To resolve this problem,
network theorists indicate that, faced with uncertainty about a
partner, actors adopt a more social orientation and resort to
existing networks to discover information that lowers search costs
and alleviates the risk of poor performance and potential oppor-
tunism (Baum et al., 2005; Gulati, 1998). A reasonable strategy for
buyer managers, in this context, is to rely on third parties, that is,
other buyer firms who have dealt with the supplier before, to guide
their partner selection decisions.
Third-party information enables the formation of trust, not2 Our conceptualization matches Sako’s (1992), with competence trust as a first
essential element, and goodwill trust as a second component which includes
contractual trust (referring to the expectation that the other party is honest and
will abide by its contractual obligations), but goes beyond that given that many
relationships cannot be safeguarded by contracts alone and thus incorporates the
belief that the other party will do more than formally or contractually committed to
doing (generally based on expectations that the other party will behave in the
interest of the relationship, without opportunism). Contractual trust is not
considered as a separate dimension because, in this perspective, it is not distinct
from goodwill trust (see also, Langfield-Smith, 2008).
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partner, but on the partner’s history of cooperation with other
firms. Arguably, third parties are influential conduits of trust
because of their ability to diffuse trust-relevant information. More
precisely, Uzzi (1997) indicates that third parties can function as
important go-betweens and roll-over the expectations from an
existing relationship to newly formed ones, furnishing a basis for
trust and subsequent commitments. In this way, trust is thought to
develop through a transference process (Doney & Cannon, 1997;
McEvily et al., 2003). The premise behind the concept of trust
transfer is that buyer managers infer the trustworthiness of a
supplier through the partnering experiences of other firms.
One situation in which this occurs is when experiences and,
specifically, information about how a collaboration partner per-
formed in previous engagements, are actively transmitted and
communicated by other firms. If such third-party information is
indicative of positive past performance, this increases confidence in
the potential of productive future exchange. Prior research found
indeed that allowing participants to know potential partners’ his-
tory of cooperationwith previous partners and that the history was
positive increased their own willingness to initially cooperate in
situations requiring trust (e.g., Bohnet & Huck, 2004; Buskens &
Weesie, 2000). In this perspective, trust transfer is consistent
with theories of performance-feedback learning (Baum et al., 2005;
Li & Rowley, 2002), where managers deal with partner uncertainty
by considering the outcomes of past interactions and, logically,
choosing those partners associated with favorable outcomes.
However, if trust in a partner only emerges based on informa-
tion about positive past performance then, all else equal, a buyer
manager’s trust in the supplier should be the same in the absence of
such information (regardless of whether it can be observed that
other firms have done similar business with this supplier). In
contrast, we draw on information-based theories of imitation to
predict that the mere knowledge of third-party dealings is able to
induce trust transfer.
Even in the absence of information about their outcomes, it can
be reassuring to know that other firms have been involved in
similar types of dealings with the partner. This is of particular
relevance when new or young firms are involved, given that such
firms do not have many pre-established communication channels
to others, yet they may be able to observe others’ ties (Stewart,
2003). Information implicit in the actions of others, although
highly imperfect, can have a strong influence on managerial per-
ceptions and beliefs (Lieberman& Asaba, 2006). For example, buyer
managers may be aware of third-party dealings with the supplier
through companywebpages or partner search platforms and, based
on this observation, conclude that the supplier must be trust-
worthy. The mimetic trust hypothesis, in fact, suggests that in-
dividuals attempt to reduce uncertainty about the trustworthiness
of potential trustees by imitating the choice behavior of others in a
similar network position (Wittek, 2001). That is, if other trustors
trust a certain trustee, their behavior can be perceived as a signal
that trust can be placed safely (Barrera & Buskens, 2007).
The preceding discussion delineates the crucial role third parties
play in the development of trust and subsequent partner selection.
Importantly, we put forward a distinction between two levels of
third-party information, i.e., information including the positive
outcomes of other firms’ dealings vs. information entailing others’artner selection in interfirm relationships, Accounting, Organizations
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representations of trust transfer, but with variation in terms of the
completeness of the information available.
In addition, we consider the interplay of these external, third-
party, sources of information with internal knowledge available
from own prior experience. The idea that learning through partner
experience promotes trust is well known (e.g., Dekker, 2008;
Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010). Despite its importance for trust
development and partner selection, however, research on third-
party influences did not incorporate potential interactions with
one’s own prior experience (e.g., Barrera & Buskens, 2007). The
organizational learning literature, though, submits that such in-
teractions are likely and, as pointed out by Schwab (2007), not
accounting for them can lead to severely underspecified models.
Typically, information regarding previous dealings is stored within
the organization and can be accessed by its members, even if they
were not personally involved in those dealings (Schilke & Cook,
2013). Thus, even if individual managers at partner firms have
not interacted directly before, the prior ties between their respec-
tive firms may lay the foundation for trust between them. This
likely affects the extent towhich third-party information influences
trust judgments and motivates a conditional perspective on when
third parties matter most.
To summarize, the theoretical model we examine appears in
Fig. 1. As can be seen, trust is the keystone of the model, and is
expected to mediate the relationship between third-party infor-
mation and partner selection. We believe it is imperative to
differentiate among competence and goodwill trust, as these
concern the major uncertainties that need to be managed in
interfirm relationships. That is, if third parties are theorized to be
helpful because they generate trust, it is important to specify what
type of trust it is and to empirically test the assumed associations.
Further, recognizing the impact of learning from own prior expe-
rience, it is included to moderate the relationship between third-
party information and trust. This set of proposed relations repre-
sents what has been termed a moderated mediation model
(Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007), and is discussed in detail in the
following sections.2.3. The role of third-party information in forming trusting beliefs
Considering the risk-mitigating function of trust at the rela-
tionship formation stage, we explicate how available third-party
information can be interpreted to activate specific competence
and goodwill trusting beliefs.
Building on prior research, we expect that knowing about other
firms’ dealings with the supplier, even when nothing is known
about their outcomes, is able to instill competence trust. The
defining features of competence trust are the various resources and
capabilities of the supplier, which are needed to perform
adequately and fulfill relationship objectives (Das & Teng, 2001;
Langfield-Smith, 2008). If other buyer firms have collaborated with
the supplier, this signals that these firms must, at minimum, have
believed that the supplier does possess the capability to accomplish
given tasks in the relationship, providing a basis for competence
trust. Applying the imitation logic discussed above, buyermanagers
would infer competence of a supplier through the partnering de-
cisions of other buyer firms, and thus come to the conclusion that3 The outcome information we consider in this study is satisfaction with the
relationship. This does not only reflect objective performance outcomes but also the
relational quality underlying these outcomes and, therefore, relevant to interfirm
trust development, involving both the competency and intentional aspect of trust
(see also, Laan, Noorderhaven, Voordijk, & Dewulf, 2011).
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others do (McCutcheon& Stuart, 2000). Such a strategy should help
reduce perceived performance risk, especially when similar col-
laborations are concerned, such that the implied competencies are
relevant to the tasks at hand. Moreover, as has been advanced in
prior research (Li & Rowley, 2002), managers evaluating potential
partners will likely consider the experience that other firms have
with this partner as a capability indicator. Especially when several
other buyer firms have done similar business with the supplier, the
supplier is assumed to have the appropriate skills and expertise,
improving confidence in its ability to succeed in the collaboration.
Thus, we predict a buyer manager’s competence trust to be higher
when the buyer manager knows other buyer firms that have done
similar business with the supplier, compared towhen this is not the
case.
In addition, knowing that these other buyer firms were satisfied
in their dealings with the supplier is likely to increase the buyer
manager’s competence trust in the supplier even more. In this case,
buyer managers may attribute other buyer firms’ satisfaction, in
part, to the supplier’s capabilities and expertise to perform its task
effectively. Even if such capabilities cannot be directly identified, or
the means-ends relationship is unclear, successful outcomes are
likely to reinforce competence trusting beliefs (Li & Rowley, 2002).
In fact, firms that have been successful in previous alliances tend to
build a reputation for competence (Das & Teng, 2001). Such a
favorable reputation is easily transferrable across firms (Doney &
Cannon, 1997; Ganesan, 1994), suggesting a positive association
between supplier reputation and the focal buyer manager compe-
tence trust. Specifically, assuming that other firms’ satisfactionwith
the supplier provides supplementary positive signals about the
supplier’s ability to perform its role competently, this should
enhance competence trust more than if buyer managers initially
have little or no outcome information to draw on.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
H1. The buyer manager’s level of competence trust in the supplier
(i) is higher when the buyer manager knows other buyer firms that
have done similar business with the supplier and (ii) further in-
creases when the buyer manager knows that this resulted in good
outcomes.
Compared to competence trust, goodwill trust is argued to be
relatively harder to establish and more fragile (Emsley & Kidon,
2007). As indicated above, a straightforward way to deal with un-
certainty about potential partners is to trust those who received
trust choices by other firms. Because competence trust is predi-
cated on universalistic standards (Sako,1992), it is possible to verify
competency based on information about the partner’s general po-
sition in the market. Specifically, other firms choosing the supplier
for similar business relationships gives the buyer manager a sense
of confidence that the supplier is capable of performing its role,
such that performance risk will be perceived as relatively low (Das
& Teng, 2001). The fact that other buyer firms have decided to
partner with the supplier, however, does not by itself help to lower
perceived relational risk. This is because relational risk is associated
with the manager’s concerns about the supplier’s possible
engagement in opportunistic behavior to exploit their vulnerabil-
ities. Such a posture is only challengingly mitigated by other firms’
dealings, especially when outcome information is lacking. Since the
mere observation that others have done business with the supplier,
without knowing their outcomes, does not inform about the sup-
plier’s inherent intentions to make the relationship work, we pre-
dict that it would not affect goodwill trust. Hence, unlike
competence trust, which can be reasonably derived through third-
party observation with little outcome information, we expect that
trust of the goodwill sort is not as easily transferred acrossartner selection in interfirm relationships, Accounting, Organizations
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hold for goodwill trust.
Instead, verification of whether a partner is worthy of goodwill
trust requires a history of demonstrated good intentions. One may
argue that relational risk is very much relationship specific, and
that goodwill trust can only be realized through actual interaction,
not word-of-mouth (Ganesan, 1994; McCutcheon & Stuart, 2000).
At the same time, research has shown that relational behaviors of a
potential supplier can be interpreted and predicted by the repu-
tation of trustworthiness that the supplier has established in the
network (e.g., Kim, 2014; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). Essentially, this
rests on the assumption that, if a supplier has been trustworthy for
a particular set of partner firms, then they should be trustworthy
for a new trustor in a structural position that is similar to those of
the other trustors. Positive experiences of other buyer firms, in this
sense, producemeaningful goodwill-related information, and likely
influence one’s own expectations about the intentions of the sup-
plier. Specifically, if other buyers were satisfied with the relation-
ship, this can be interpreted as the supplier dealing fairly and caring
about the buyer firm’s welfare. With such a reputation, the focal
buyer manager may feel more assured that the supplier will
cooperate in good faith, rather than behave opportunistically
(Dekker, 2004; Rooks, Raub, & Tazelaar, 2006). In line with this
perspective, and other research in accounting suggesting reputa-
tion as one of the precursors of goodwill trust (e.g., Langfield-Smith,
2008; Velez, Sanchez, & Alvarez-Dardet, 2008), we posit that
goodwill trust can be transferred, provided that sufficient infor-
mation about the past is available, and that the supplier proved to
be trustworthy.
This leads to the following hypothesis:
H2. The buyer manager’s level of goodwill trust in the supplier (i)
is unaffected when the buyer manager simply knows other buyer
firms that have done similar business with the supplier but (ii)
increases when the buyer manager knows other buyer firms that
have done similar business with the supplier and that this resulted
in good outcomes.2.4. The effect of trusting beliefs on partner selection
In line with our above conceptualization of trust, and based on
the theory of reasoned action (see also, Currall & Judge, 1995;
McKnight, Cummins, & Chervany, 1998), we expect that a buyer
manager’s decision to engage in a collaboration with a specific
supplier will be based on his/her assessment of the supplier’s
trustworthiness. This is consistent with observations of scholars
who identify trust as one of the important criteria for partner se-
lection (e.g., Ding et al., 2013; Shah & Swaminathan, 2008). More-
over, in a detailed case study, Mahama and Chua (2016) report thatPlease cite this article as: Reusen, E.,& Stouthuysen, K., Trust transfer and p
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know and trust” (p. 36). As buyers typically favor suppliers they
trust in terms of competence and goodwill (Dekker et al., 2013),
both dimensions of trust are relevant in this context. In fact, while
firms are exposed to both performance risk and relational risk
when initiating collaborations (e.g., Das & Teng, 2001; Langfield-
Smith, 2008), competence trust and goodwill trust, respectively,
drive the perception that such risks are at an acceptable level.
Trusting beliefs thus act as an evaluative mechanism regarding the
extent towhich buyermanagers foresee positive outcomes to result
from collaborating with the supplier. If the manager believes in the
abilities and intentions of the supplier, s/he will be confident that
the supplier will deliver in the future and thus will bemore likely to
select this supplier to collaborate with. Therefore, we predict a
positive relationship between both competence trust and goodwill
trust and the likelihood of the supplier to be selected.
H3. The higher the buyer manager’s level of competence trust in
the supplier, the higher the likelihood of the supplier to be selected.
H4. The higher the buyer manager’s level of goodwill trust in the
supplier, the higher the likelihood of the supplier to be selected.2.5. The indirect effect of third-party information on partner
selection
Given that we expect third-party information to influence trust,
and trust to influence partner selection, we further propose that
third-party information will have an indirect effect on partner se-
lection via its influence on trust. That is, third-party information
affects partner selection indirectly by conveying positive expecta-
tions and increasing a buyer manager’s competence and/or good-
will trust in the supplier. In line with the above, simply knowing
other buyer firms that have trusted the supplier is expected to
promote partner selection because it increases the buyer manager’s
competence trust, not so much goodwill trust. If third-party in-
formation includes positive experiences, competence as well as
goodwill trust may be formed, both of which in turn are expected to
increase the likelihood of the supplier being selected. The corre-
sponding hypotheses appear below, with the underlying logic that
competence trust and goodwill trust result, in their ownway, from
third-party information and, subsequently, influence partner
selection:
H5. Competence trust mediates the effects of third-party infor-
mation on partner selection.
H6. Goodwill trust mediates the effects of third-party information
on partner selection.artner selection in interfirm relationships, Accounting, Organizations
4 In new product development relationships, there is a high need for the firm to
establish trust in the partner company. In fact, trust between partners is an
essential element for successful collaboration in new product development; much
more than in other buyer-supplier relationships that are less uncertain and less
risky (see also, Bstieler, 2006; Jørgensen & Messner, 2010).
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When the buyer and supplier themselves have done business
before, this provides the buyer manager with an initial information
basis (Blumberg, 2001; Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010), which
may render third-party information less influential. More specif-
ically, we posit that available information from own prior experi-
ence substitutes for third-party information in developing trust.
The rationale for this substitutional effect is that, if the buyer itself
had positive experiences with the supplier, the available internal
information already helps to resolve many of the difficulties or
uncertainties inherent in the trust problem under consideration,
such that information from other firms’ experiences becomes less
critical. The literature offers two more detailed underlying mech-
anisms for this, based on information redundancy and information
preferences.
First, if decision-makers are only influenced by novel or unique
information, then information from multiple sources has a substi-
tutional effect if these sources provide redundant or duplicate in-
formation (Schwab, 2007). In our context, this implies that third
parties are most valuable for making trust judgments when they
provide information not available elsewhere. Research in negotia-
tions, for instance, shows that, especially in the absence of direct
prior experience with a specific party, one will prepare for in-
teractions with that party by gathering reputational information
(e.g., Glick & Croson, 2001). In contrast, when a firm is already
familiar with a potential partner, they have little need of such in-
formation, as they can rely primarily on their own experience
(Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010). If the firm was satisfied with
previous collaborations, it is plausible to assume that the supplier is
sufficiently capable and not prone to opportunistic behavior
(Ganesan, 1994; Rooks et al., 2006). Hence, with prior interactions
and a performance history demonstrating the supplier’s compe-
tence and goodwill, information about the supplier’s trustworthi-
ness via third parties will provide relatively little additional value to
the buyer manager.
Second, own firm experiences are often seen as more informa-
tive than those of other firms, suggesting a preference for internal
over external information. This preference for internal feedback
information again suggests a substitutional effect, as available
external information may be ignored (Schwab, 2007). With respect
to interfirm partnering, it has been argued that decision-makers
will rely on the most direct source of information and experience
they have becausemuch of the risk and uncertainty associated with
partner selection is partner specific (Baum et al., 2005; Podolny,
1994). Prior studies on partner choice also provide evidence
consistent with the notion that first-hand information is often
preferred over second-hand information (e.g., Ding et al., 2013).
According to this logic, if buyer managers already possess reliable
and rich internal performance feedback, which generates confi-
dence in the supplier’s competence and goodwill (McCutcheon &
Stuart, 2000), additional available external information would not
produce an effect.
Collectively, these arguments and evidence suggest that third-
party information appeals most to those with little prior informa-
tion on which to base a decision; more knowledgeable managers
can rely on what they know internally (see also, Lieberman &
Asaba, 2006). Thus, while third-party information is expected to
influence competence trust and goodwill trust, this influence is
predicted to be weaker when the buyer and the potential supplier
have had prior experience as compared to when this is not the case.
Accordingly, we hypothesize that:
H7. Prior experience moderates the effects of third-party infor-
mation on the buyer manager’s level of competence trust, such thatPlease cite this article as: Reusen, E.,& Stouthuysen, K., Trust transfer and p
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with the supplier compared to when the buyer has no prior expe-
rience with the supplier.
H8. Prior experience moderates the effects of third-party infor-
mation on the buyer manager’s level of goodwill trust, such that the
effects will be weaker when the buyer has prior experience with
the supplier compared to when the buyer has no prior experience
with the supplier.
Finally, since we conceptualize a mediation effect, the moder-
ating role of prior experience in the relationship between third-
party information and trust implies a moderated mediation
model. Specifically, H5-H6 and H7-8 when combined suggest that
the indirect effect of third-party information on partner selection
through competence trust and goodwill trust, respectively, is
weaker for those with prior experience than those without prior
experience. Altogether, we hypothesize the following:
H9. Prior experience moderates the indirect effects of third-party
information on partner selection via competence trust, such that
the indirect effects will be weaker when the buyer has prior
experience with the supplier compared to when the buyer has no
prior experience with the supplier.
H10. Prior experience moderates the indirect effects of third-
party information on partner selection via goodwill trust, such
that the indirect effects will be weaker when the buyer has prior
experience with the supplier compared to when the buyer has no
prior experience with the supplier.3. Method
We use a 2 (prior experience absent vs. prior experience pre-
sent) x 3 (control group vs. neutral third-party information vs.
favorable third-party information) between-subjects experimental
design, in which participants were asked to indicate their trust in a
potential partner, and subsequently to decide on partner selection.
3.1. Participants and procedures
Participants are students recruited from a postgraduate pro-
gramme in management at a Western European business school.
The experiment was administered during a scheduled classroom
session. All participants were volunteers and, in turn for their
participation, had the chance to win movie tickets. In total, 156
students completed the experiment.
The participants assumed the role of an R&D manager in a
technology firm, being responsible for finding an adequate supplier
firm to collaborate with on a new product development project.
This specific setting is used as it introduces interesting aspects of
trust formation and subsequent partner selection.4 The situation
represents a trust problem in which participants had to evaluate
the trustworthiness of a potential supplier, both regarding its
competence and goodwill. It was explicitly emphasized that the
success of the collaboration would depend on their supplierartner selection in interfirm relationships, Accounting, Organizations
7 Participants were also asked to provide an assessment of their willingness to
engage in a collaborationwith the supplier described in the experiment. The results
using this measure are qualitatively similar to the results using the supplier se-
lection measure.
8 We also measured other personal characteristics such as uncertainty avoidance,
E. Reusen, K. Stouthuysen / Accounting, Organizations and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx 7selection.5
The experimental procedurewas as follows. After explaining the
instructions, participants were asked to read the scenario. The basic
scenario was described on the first page and all participants
received the same information to this point. Besides their role
description, participants were told that the new product develop-
ment is of crucial strategic importance to the firm and involves a
large amount of money. This is included to reflect situational
importance and to induce individuals tomore carefully evaluate the
situation before making decisions. Furthermore, participants were
informed that the outcomes of the project will only become clear
after the project has been initiated, and especially will hinge upon
the working relationship with the supplier. The reason for this is
that actively looking for information about the potential partner is
more likely to take place in relatively uncertain and risky situa-
tions.6 After pointing this out, participants were instructed to the
second page, presenting a more detailed description of a potential
supplier with whom their firm can do business, including the
experimental manipulations. Participants were randomly assigned
to one of the six experimental conditions. In the next step, partic-
ipants were asked to indicate their trust in the supplier described to
them, and subsequently the likelihood they would select this
particular supplier to collaborate with. Finally, participants had to
respond to two manipulation check questions, and were asked to
fill in some demographic questions, as well as questions regarding
their motivation to perform the experiment and their under-
standing of the experimental task.
3.2. Manipulations
The two independent variables manipulated in our experiment
are information from own firm experience and from third parties.
First, information from own prior experience was manipulated by
telling the participants either that their firm has never done busi-
ness beforewith the supplier (prior experience absent condition) or
that their firm has done business with the supplier before and was
satisfied with this (prior experience present condition). Second,
third-party information is manipulated by either giving no infor-
mation about other buyer firms’ previous experiences with the
supplier (control group), by indicating that they know other buyer
firms that have done similar business with the supplier (neutral
third-party information condition) or by indicating that they know
other buyer firms that have done similar business with the supplier
and were satisfied (favorable third-party information condition).
We use these three levels in order to study the difference between
no information, neutral information, and favorable information
related to others’ experiences with the partner. After all, trust
transfer might occur without knowing the outcomes obtained by
others, or could be based on information that includes the out-
comes of a given collaboration.
3.3. Measures
Regarding the dependent variables, the participants were asked
to answer a series of questions reflecting their trust in the supplier,5 In order to gauge the perceived importance of trust under the specific scenario,
we asked the participants in our post-experimental questionnaire to indicate how
critical trust was for partner selection (cf. Shah & Swaminathan, 2008). In line with
the proposed logic, participants reported high criticality ratings for both the part-
ner’s competence and goodwill.
6 In this regard, the trust literature also suggests that trusting parties must be
vulnerable, to some extent, for trust to become operational. In other words, deci-
sion outcomes must be uncertain and important to the trustor; otherwise trust
would not be needed (see also, Dekker et al., 2013; Velez et al., 2008).
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interfirm setting (e.g., McKnight, Choudhury, & Kacmar, 2002;
Nicolaou & McKnight, 2006; Nicolaou et al., 2011; Anderson et al.,
2017). The first six items in the scale capture benevolence and
integrity which reflect the individual’s belief in the supplier’s
goodwill, whereas the last three items capture the individual’s
belief in the supplier’s competence. Furthermore, participants were
asked to make decisions on partner selection. Specifically, partici-
pants needed to indicate how likely it would be that they would
select the supplier described in the experiment, if they had to make
a choice.7 In addition, we measured participants’ disposition to
trust, using a three-item scale found in prior research, as this may
also influence trusting beliefs and behaviors towards the supplier
(e.g., McKnight et al., 2002; Nicolaou & McKnight, 2006).8 Dispo-
sition to trust represents an individual’s general tendency to trust
others. It has been emphasized in the trust literature that an un-
derstanding of trust necessitates consideration of this personality
characteristic (e.g., Mayer et al., 1995; McKnight et al., 2002) and is,
therefore, incorporated as a covariate in our model.9 Scale items are
presented in Supplement I of Appendix A. All questions were to be
answered on a seven-point Likert-type scale.
4. Results
We test our hypotheses by conducting the following analyses.
First, analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) are used to test the main
effects of third-party information on competence trust and good-
will trust, controlling for the effects of trust disposition (H1 e H2).
Second, we perform a path analysis that allows us to simulta-
neously test all relationships proposed in our model, including both
direct and indirect linkages, and conditional effects (H3 e H10).
Prior to our main analyses, we performed manipulation checks on
the experimental conditions, and validated the measurement
scales.
4.1. Manipulation checks
Participants had to respond to two manipulation check ques-
tions. The first question asked participants whether their firm has
done business before with the supplier: “yes” or “no”. The second
question asked participants whether they knew any other firms
that have done similar business with the supplier: “yes” or “no”. Of
the 156 participants enrolled in the experimental sessions, 38 failed
at least one of themanipulation check questions. These participants
are excluded from our subsequent analyses, leaving us with 118preference for risk-taking behavior, and susceptibility for third-party influences, but
these were not found to be significantly related to our variables of interest and the
inclusion or exclusion of these covariates did not affect the significance of the
model relationships.
9 Significant differences exist in participants’ disposition to trust across some of
the experimental conditions, but given that there is no clear pattern observable and
our model in itself does not explain variation in trust disposition (that is, neither
third-party information nor prior experience explains observed variation in this
variable), we attribute this to mere chance rather than a systematic treatment ef-
fect, consistent with the idea that trust disposition reflects a stable within-person
factor.
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To further assess the effectiveness of our manipulations, par-
ticipants were also asked to indicate how they would characterize
their firm’s satisfaction about its prior dealings with the supplier, in
case their firm had done business with the supplier before. This
question was answered by the participants in the prior experience
present condition, and resulted in a mean score (M¼ 6.00;
SD¼ 0.53) that is significantly higher than the midpoint of the
scale. In a similar vein, in case they knew other firms that have done
similar business with the supplier, participants were asked to
indicate how they would characterize these other firms’ satisfac-
tion about their dealings with the supplier. Most of the participants
in the neutral third-party information condition correctly indicated
“do not know”, as this was not explicitly mentioned. Of the par-
ticipants in the favorable third-party information condition, none
indicated “do not know”, yielding a mean score (M¼ 6.05;
SD¼ 0.93) that is significantly higher than the midpoint of the
scale.11
Of the final sample of participants, 56% were male, the average
agewas 24 years, and the majority had working experience of more
than 12 months. The demographic data were tested for differences
across experimental conditions to determine whether randomiza-
tion was successful. As desired, no significant differences were
found (all p> 0.10). The mean scores of motivation to perform the
experiment (M¼ 4.40; SD¼ 1.05) and clarity of the experimental
task (M¼ 4.40; SD¼ 1.26) were significantly larger than the
midpoint of the scale, indicating that the participants were well
motivated and understood the task. We did not find any significant
differences across the experimental conditions on these variables
either (all p> 0.10).
4.2. Measurement validation
Given that we adapted the measures of trust from prior studies,
we performed an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) on the set of nine
questions to assess the validity of the construct. The results reveal
two distinct factors (eigenvalues larger than 1; accounting for
57.34% of the variance). The first six items load on one factor, rep-
resenting goodwill trust. The last three items load on the second
factor, representing competence trust. We further evaluated the
trust construct by running a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). The
model distinguishing between goodwill trust and competence trust
demonstrates a good fit (c2/df¼ 1.08; GFI¼ 0.95; CFI¼ 0.99;
RMSEA¼ 0.03). All items load significantly on their respective
factors, indicating convergent validity of the measures. To assess
discriminant validity, we computed the average variance extracted,
and found that these are greater than the shared variance between10 As a way to explore the reason for participants failing manipulation checks, we
looked at the motivation to perform the experiment of those who failed the
manipulation checks. The test revealed a mean score insignificantly different from
the midpoint of the scale (M¼ 4.08; SD¼ 1.38). This indicates that these partici-
pants were not well motivated and might have caused them to pay insufficient
attention to the details in the experiment, providing an explanation for their
incorrect answers. As a robustness check, we reran the analyses using the full
sample and found that the results remain qualitatively the same, although the
statistical significance of the effects of third-party information on competence trust
becomes slightly weaker.
11 Some of the participants in the neutral third-party information condition
indicated a satisfaction level ranging from 4 to 7, with the mean score (M¼ 5.36;
SD¼ 0.56) significantly higher than the midpoint of the scale. Thus, an intriguing
result of the experimental manipulation is that, if they are told that others have
done business with the supplier, some participants infer that it must have been
good, even when the outcomes are not explicitly mentioned. However, in the
favorable third-party information condition, participants scored the satisfaction
levels significantly higher than in the neutral condition (t¼ 2.74; p< 0.01). Based
on this we conclude that the manipulations have worked.
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ference in chi-square values between the constrained and uncon-
strained model, confirming discriminant validity. The Cronbach
alpha of 0.79 for competence trust and 0.78 for goodwill trust re-
flects high construct reliability. In testing the hypotheses, we
differentiate between competence trust and goodwill trust, and
derive these two variables by calculating individual scores asmeans
of the combined scale items. Table 1 reports the descriptive sta-
tistics for both competence trust and goodwill trust by experi-
mental condition.
For trust disposition, all items significantly load on one factor.
Cronbach alpha equals 0.73. From this we conclude that the mea-
sure is valid and reliable.4.3. ANCOVA: testing H1 e H2
The first set of hypotheses relates to the effects of third-party
information on the buyer manager’s trust in a potential supplier
firm, holding the effect of own firm experience constant. Table 2
and Table 3 present the results for competence trust and goodwill
trust, respectively. Panel A provides the means and standard errors
by condition. Panel B provides the ANCOVA results. As indicated
above, we include trust disposition as covariate to control for the
variation in participants’ inherent propensity to trust.12
To investigate differences in trust formation between the third-
party information treatments, and test for H1 and H2, we use
planned comparisons.
Specifically, H1 predicts (i) an increase in competence trust
when the buyer manager knows other buyer firms that have done
similar business with the supplier and (ii) an additional increase
when it is known that this resulted in good outcomes. The results in
Table 2 Panel C indicate that, compared to the control group,
competence trust is significantly higher in the neutral third-party
information condition (mean difference¼ 0.26, p¼ 0.06).13 This
pattern of results is illustrated in Fig. 2. As the neutral third-party
information condition results in higher competence trust than in
the control condition, we find support for trust transfer, even in the
absence of relevant outcome information. However, no significant
difference is observed when we compare the neutral and favorable
third-party information conditions (mean difference¼ 0.12,
p¼ 0.24). The rational or adaptive response to outcome feedback
would be to incorporate the implications of the additional infor-
mation, leading to a further increase in competence trust. Yet, even
though the effect of additional outcome information is in the pre-
dicted direction, it does not turn out to be significant.14 Thus, the
results support part (i) of H1 but not part (ii).
Further, H2 predicts (i) no effect on goodwill trust when the
buyer manager simply knows other buyer firms that have done
similar business with the supplier but (ii) an increase when it is
known that this resulted in good outcomes. Consistent with these
two predictions, results in Table 3 Panel C indicate that goodwill
trust does not significantly differ between the control group and12 The results without trust disposition as covariate are reported in the online
supplement (see Appendix A, Supplement II). It must be noted that, while the in-
clusion of the covariate does not alter the model estimates for competence trust,
the effects of third-party information on goodwill trust are reliant on the presence
of the covariate. Our findings should be interpreted in light of this.
13 p-values are reported on a one-tailed basis, given the directional predictions of
the effects.
14 As implied by the above findings, competence trust is not significantly higher in
the favorable third-party information condition as compared to the neutral third-
party information condition, but favorable third-party information does produce
a significant increase in competence trust as compared to the control condition
(mean difference¼ 0.37, p¼ 0.01).
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Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Means and Standard Deviations for Competence trust
Prior experience Third-party information
Control group Neutral Favorable Row total
Absent 4.76 5.09 5.11 4.98
(0.61) (0.67) (0.75) (0.68)
n¼ 21 n¼ 19 n¼ 19 n¼ 59
Present 5.33 5.53 5.68 5.50
(0.75) (0.70) (0.86) (0.77)
n¼ 21 n¼ 19 n¼ 19 n¼ 59
Column total 5.05 5.31 5.39
(0.73) (0.71) (0.84)
n¼ 42 n¼ 38 n¼ 38
Means and Standard Deviations for Goodwill trust
Prior experience Third-party information
Control group Neutral Favorable Row total
Absent 4.60 4.62 4.63 4.62
(0.68) (0.56) (0.84) (0.59)
n¼ 21 n¼ 19 n¼ 19 n¼ 59
Present 5.03 5.04 5.26 5.11
(0.43) (0.76) (0.62) (0.61)
n¼ 21 n¼ 19 n¼ 19 n¼ 59
Column total 4.81 4.83 4.95
(0.61) (0.69) (0.79)
n¼ 42 n¼ 38 n¼ 38
Note: Means are reported with Standard Deviations in parentheses.
Table 2
ANCOVA on Competence trust.
PANEL A: Adjusted Means and Standard Errorsa
Prior experience Third-party information
Control group Neutral Favorable Row total
Absent 4.74 5.09 5.14 4.99
(0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.09)
n¼ 21 n¼ 19 n¼ 19 n¼ 59
Present 5.34 5.50 5.68 5.51
(0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.09)
n¼ 21 n¼ 19 n¼ 19 n¼ 59
Column total 5.04 5.30 5.41
(0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
n¼ 42 n¼ 38 n¼ 38
PANEL B: Test of Between-Subjects Effectsb
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p-value (two-tailed)
Trust disposition 1.00 1 1.00 1.92 0.17
Third-party information 2.92 2 1.46 2.82 0.06
Prior experience 7.77 1 7.77 14.97 <0.01
Third-party information*Prior experience 0.18 2 0.09 0.17 0.84
error 57.63 111 0.52
PANEL C: Planned Comparisons
Mean Difference p-value (one-tailed)
Neutral third-party information vs. Control group (H1(i)) 0.26 0.06
Favorable third-party information vs. Neutral third-party information (H1(ii)) 0.12 0.24
Favorable third-party information vs. Control group 0.37 0.01
a Means are adjusted for the effect of the covariate, evaluated at mean¼ 4.69
b Model F¼ 3.88 (significance¼ 0.002); Adjusted R-squared¼ 0.13.
E. Reusen, K. Stouthuysen / Accounting, Organizations and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx 9the neutral third-party information condition (mean15 Comparing the neutral and favorable third-party information conditions, it
appears that goodwill trust is also significantly higher in the favorable third-party
information condition than in the neutral third-party information condition (mean
difference¼ 0.20, p¼ 0.08).
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able third-party information condition than in the control group
(mean difference¼ 0.21, p¼ 0.07).15 This pattern of results is
illustrated in Fig. 3. Since information about other firms’ experi-
ences without knowing the outcomes, as far as our data can tell,
does not lead to higher goodwill trust than in the control condition,artner selection in interfirm relationships, Accounting, Organizations
Table 3
ANCOVA on Goodwill trust.
PANEL A: Adjusted Means and Standard Errorsa
Prior experience Third-party information
Control group Neutral Favorable Row total
Absent 4.54 4.63 4.73 4.64
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.08)
n¼ 21 n¼ 19 n¼ 19 n¼ 59
Present 5.04 4.97 5.26 5.09
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.08)
n¼ 21 n¼ 19 n¼ 19 n¼ 59
Column total 4.79 4.80 5.00
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
n¼ 42 n¼ 38 n¼ 38
PANEL B: Test of Between-Subjects Effectsb
Source Sum of Squares df Mean Square F p-value (two-tailed)
Trust disposition 6.91 1 6.91 18.26 <0.01
Third-party information 1.03 2 0.52 1.36 0.26
Prior experience 6.09 1 6.09 16.08 <0.01
Third-party information*Prior experience 0.21 2 0.11 0.28 0.76
error 42.01 111 0.38
PANEL C: Planned Comparisons
Mean Difference p-value (one-tailed)
Neutral third-party information vs. Control group (H2(i)) 0.01 0.48
Favorable third-party information vs. Neutral third-party information 0.20 0.08
Favorable third-party information vs. Control group (H2(ii)) 0.21 0.07
a Means are adjusted for the effect of the covariate, evaluated at mean¼ 4.69.
b Model F¼ 6.49 (significance¼ 0.000); Adjusted R-squared¼ 0.22.
Fig. 2. Third-party information effects on Competence trust. The figure displays
estimated marginal means of competence trust for the three third-party information
experimental conditions (control group, neutral third-party information, favorable
third-party information). The estimates include participants’ trust disposition as a
covariate (evaluated at mean¼ 4.69).
Fig. 3. Third-party information effects on Goodwill trust. The figure displays esti-
mated marginal means of goodwill trust for the three third-party information exper-
imental conditions (control group, neutral third-party information, favorable third-
party information). The estimates include participants’ trust disposition as a covari-
ate (evaluated at mean¼ 4.69).
16 Additional analyses on the differential effects for competence trust and good-
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this provides support for H2 (i) and (ii).
In sum, the results show that knowledge of other firms’ dealings
with the supplier, even without any outcome information, in-
creases participants’ level of competence trust in the supplier.
However, for goodwill trust, we do not find this to be a sufficient
condition, presumably because neutral third-party information
lacks the content to reduce uncertainty about the supplier’s good
intentions. The participants’ goodwill trust does increase when it is
known that other firms had good outcomes, such that it providesPlease cite this article as: Reusen, E.,& Stouthuysen, K., Trust transfer and p
and Society, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2019.101081confidence in the supplier’s cooperative intent. These findings thus
point to the relative ease of transferring competence trust, as
compared to goodwill trust.16
4.4. Path analysis: testing H3 e H10
To analyze the subsequent effects on partner selection, wewill trust are provided in the online supplement (see Appendix A, Supplement III).
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information, competence trust and goodwill trust, and the likeli-
hood to select, while controlling for trust disposition. To remain
consistent with the analysis of moderated mediation, the effect of
prior experience is also included. The path coefficients are pre-
sented in Table 4 and Fig. 4.
Since we have three condition treatments for third-party in-
formation, and the three levels of manipulation can be rank ordered
with respect to the completeness of the information available, weTable 4
Path coefficients.
Estimate Standard Error t-statistic p-value (one-tailed)
PANEL A: Sequential codinga
Paths to Competence trust (R2 ¼ 0.17)
Neutral third-party information / Competence trust (H1(i)) 0.26 0.16 1.59 0.06
Favorable third-party information / Competence trust (H1(ii)) 0.12 0.17 0.71 0.24
Prior experience / Competence trust 0.60 0.22 2.67 <0.01
Neutral third-party information*Prior experience / Competence trust (H7) 0.19 0.32 0.57 0.28
Favorable third-party information*Prior experience / Competence trust (H7) 0.13 0.33 0.40 0.35
Trust disposition / Competence trust 0.09 0.07 1.39 0.08
Paths to Goodwill trust (R2 ¼ 0.26)
Neutral third-party information / Goodwill trust 0.01 0.14 0.05 0.48
Favorable third-party information / Goodwill trust 0.20 0.14 1.39 0.08
Prior experience / Goodwill trust 0.50 0.19 2.63 <0.01
Neutral third-party information*Prior experience / Goodwill trust 0.16 0.28 0.59 0.28
Favorable third-party information*Prior experience / Goodwill trust 0.19 0.28 0.69 0.25
Trust disposition / Goodwill trust 0.24 0.06 4.27 <0.01
Paths to Partner selection (R2 ¼ 0.30)
Competence trust / Partner selection (H3) 0.28 0.12 2.26 0.01
Goodwill trust / Partner selection (H4) 0.41 0.14 2.85 <0.01
Neutral third-party information / Partner selection 0.06 0.19 0.32 0.37
Favorable third-party information / Partner selection 0.19 0.20 0.95 0.17
Prior experience / Partner selection 0.38 0.17 2.20 0.02
Trust disposition / Partner selection 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.48
PANEL B: Indicator codingb
Paths to Competence trust (R2 ¼ 0.17)
Neutral third-party information / Competence trust 0.26 0.16 1.59 0.06
Favorable third-party information / Competence trust 0.37 0.16 2.30 0.01
Prior experience / Competence trust 0.60 0.22 2.67 <0.01
Neutral third-party information*Prior experience / Competence trust 0.19 0.32 0.57 0.28
Favorable third-party information*Prior experience / Competence trust 0.06 0.33 0.17 0.43
Trust disposition / Competence trust 0.09 0.07 1.39 0.08
Paths to Goodwill trust (R2 ¼ 0.26)
Neutral third-party information / Goodwill trust (H2(i)) 0.01 0.14 0.05 0.48
Favorable third-party information / Goodwill trust (H2(ii)) 0.21 0.14 1.48 0.07
Prior experience / Goodwill trust 0.50 0.19 2.63 <0.01
Neutral third-party information*Prior experience / Goodwill trust (H8) 0.16 0.28 0.59 0.28
Favorable third-party information*Prior experience / Goodwill trust (H8) 0.03 0.28 0.10 0.46
Trust disposition / Goodwill trust 0.24 0.06 4.27 <0.01
Paths to Partner selection (R2 ¼ 0.30)
Competence trust / Partner selection (H3) 0.28 0.12 2.26 0.01
Goodwill trust / Partner selection (H4) 0.41 0.14 2.85 <0.01
Neutral third-party information / Partner selection 0.06 0.19 0.32 0.37
Favorable third-party information / Partner selection 0.13 0.20 0.64 0.26
Prior experience / Partner selection 0.38 0.17 2.20 0.02
Trust disposition / Partner selection 0.00 0.08 0.04 0.48
a The sequential coding system constructs two code variables, considering the neutral third-party information condition relative to the control condition, and the favorable
third-party information condition relative to the neutral third-party information condition (i.e., the effects of group membership are compared relative to the group one step
sequentially lower in the ordered system).
b The indicator coding system constructs two code variables, comparing the experimental conditions of neutral and favorable third-party information, respectively, with the
control condition (i.e., the control group functions as the reference group).use both a sequential and indicator coding system to fully represent
the relative effects (Hayes& Preacher, 2014).With sequential codes,
the relative effects can be interpreted as the effects of membershipPlease cite this article as: Reusen, E.,& Stouthuysen, K., Trust transfer and p
and Society, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2019.101081in one group relative to the group one step sequentially lower in the
ordered system. In our case, this allows us to compare the neutral
third-party information condition relative to the control group, and
the favorable third-party information condition relative to the
neutral third-party information condition. With indicator coding,
the control group functions as the reference group, allowing us to
investigate the effects of the neutral and favorable third-party in-
formation experimental conditions, relative to the control group.
For completeness, we first assess the link between third-partyinformation and trusting beliefs, in line with the results discussed
above. The path coefficients to competence trust in Panel A of
Table 4 and Fig. 4 quantify the mean differences in competenceartner selection in interfirm relationships, Accounting, Organizations
Fig. 4. Empirical Results. The figure presents the moderated mediation model, controlling for trust disposition.
PANEL A: Sequential Coding
The sequential coding scheme reflects the hypothesized model for competence trust, as highlighted in bold. Path c represents the total effect of third-party information on partner
selection; Path c’ represents the incremental effect of third-party information on partner selection after accounting for the effect of competence trust and goodwill trust. *, **, ***
indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (one-tailed).
PANEL B: Indicator Coding
The indicator coding scheme reflects the hypothesized model for goodwill trust, as highlighted in bold. Path c represents the total effect of third-party information on partner
selection; Path c’ represents the incremental effect of third-party information on partner selection after accounting for the effect of competence trust and goodwill trust.*, **, ***
indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively (one-tailed).
E. Reusen, K. Stouthuysen / Accounting, Organizations and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx12trust between the neutral third-party information and control
condition, and between the favorable and neutral third-party in-
formation condition, confirming our earlier findings with respect to
H1. The results show a significant path from neutral third-party
information to competence trust (b¼ 0.26, p¼ 0.06), yet favor-
able third-party information does not produce an additional sig-
nificant increase (b¼ 0.12, p¼ 0.24). The path coefficients to
goodwill trust in Panel B of Table 4 and Fig. 4 are particularly
instructive with respect to the pattern predicted in H2. Again, wePlease cite this article as: Reusen, E.,& Stouthuysen, K., Trust transfer and p
and Society, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2019.101081find that, compared to the control group, neutral third-party in-
formation shows no significant effect on goodwill trust (b¼ 0.01,
p¼ 0.48), while favorable third-party information does (b¼ 0.21,
p¼ 0.07).
Regarding the second link in our model, we predicted that the
buyer manager’s level of competence trust and goodwill trust will
be positively associated with the likelihood of the supplier being
selected. As expected, we find that both competence trust (b¼ 0.28,
p¼ 0.01) and goodwill trust (b¼ 0.41, p< 0.01) have a significantartner selection in interfirm relationships, Accounting, Organizations
Table 5
Indirect effects.a
Neutral third-party information vs.
Control groupb
Favorable vs. Neutral third-party
informationc
Favorable third-party information vs.
Control groupd
CIe CIe CIe
Effect SE (boot) Lower Upper Effect SE (boot) Lower Upper Effect SE (boot) Lower Upper
through competence trust (H5) 0.0708 0.05 0.0105 0.1325 0.0323 0.05 0.0253 0.1025 0.1031 0.06 0.0298 0.1848
through goodwill trust (H6) 0.0027 0.06 0.0723 0.0967 0.0805 0.06 0.0080 0.1620 0.0832 0.06 0.0121 0.1620
a The specific indirect effects of third-party information on partner selection and bootstrapping results are produced by Model 4 of the PROCESS Macro based on 10,000
bootstrap samples.
b Represents the effects of neutral third-party information relative to the control condition.
c Represents the effects of favorable third-party information relative to neutral third-party information.
d Represents the effects of favorable third-party information relative to the control condition.
e 80% Confidence Intervals are reported to indicate whether an effect is significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed).
E. Reusen, K. Stouthuysen / Accounting, Organizations and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx 13positive effect on partner selection, lending support for H3 and H4.
H5 and H6 further propose that third-party information has an
indirect effect on partner selection via its influence on trust. Of
particular interest are the specific mediating roles of both compe-
tence and goodwill trust in the relationship between our third-
party information treatments and the likelihood to select. To test
for multiple mediation, we follow the recommendations by
Preacher and Hayes (2008), using the bootstrap method.17 The re-
sults are summarized in Table 5.18
The indirect effects tests reveal that, for neutral third-party in-
formation, the effect is significant through competence trust (0.07;
CI [0.01, 0.13]) but not through goodwill trust (0.00; CI [-0.07, 0.10]),
which is in line with our expectations. Those in the neutral third-
party information condition are found to be more likely to select
on average than those in the control condition, particularly as a
result of the indirect mechanism linking neutral third-party infor-
mation to partner selection through competence trust. Considering
favorable third-party information relative to neutral third-party
information, the indirect effect through competence trust is not
significant (0.03; CI [-0.03, 0.10]), but reaches significance through
goodwill trust (0.08; CI [0.01, 0.16]). Furthermore, favorable third-
party information, relative to the control condition, results in a
significant indirect effect through both competence trust (0.10; CI
[0.03, 0.18]) and goodwill trust (0.08; CI [0.01, 0.16]). The signs of
the path coefficients and indirect effects are consistent with the
interpretation that favorable third-party information, in compari-
son to having no third-party information at all, enhances both17 The literature on mediation analysis has recommended this as the preferred
inferential method; it is considered more valid and powerful than the standard
Sobel test, especially for small samples.
18 Significance tests of each indirect effect were accomplished via bootstrapping
procedures that created an 80% confidence interval around the indirect effect es-
timates. Since we have directional predictions for all indirect effects, we use 80%
confidence intervals to test whether one-tailed p-values are (at least) less than 0.10;
i.e., the reported confidence intervals that do not include zero reflect significant
indirect effects at the p< 0.10 level on a one-tailed basis.
19 This analysis also yields a quantification of the direct effect (path c’) and total
effect (path c) of third-party information on partner selection. Note, however, that
there does not need to be a significant effect to be mediated for the indirect effect to
be significant, as is the case for neutral third-party information through compe-
tence trust (i.e., the total effect is not significant but the indirect effect is). For
favorable third-party information, we find the effect on partner selection to be fully
mediated by competence trust and goodwill trust, given that the significance of the
effect disappears after inclusion of the trust mediators (i.e., the total effect is sig-
nificant whereas the direct effect is not).
20 Regarding the covariate, trust disposition has a significant positive influence on
both trust dimensions, although it is mostly conducive towards goodwill as
compared to competence trusting beliefs. The model also allows disposition to trust
impacting partner selection directly but, consistent with prior research (e.g.,
McKnight et al., 2002), this relation is found to be weak because it is largely
mediated by trusting beliefs.
Please cite this article as: Reusen, E.,& Stouthuysen, K., Trust transfer and p
and Society, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2019.101081competence trust and goodwill trust, which in turn increases the
likelihood of the supplier being selected. Thus, overall we find that
third-party information affects partner selection indirectly,
through the specific mediating roles of competence trust and
goodwill trust, in support for H5 and H6.1920
Having established that there are varying degrees of third-party
influence, we now turn to the issue of own prior experience
modifying these effects. Recall that H7 and H8 predict a negative
interaction between third-party information and prior experience.
More specifically, support for the proposed substitutional effects
requires that both third-party information and prior experience
affect trusting beliefs, but with their joint effect being weaker than
the sum of their independent effects (see also, Schwab, 2007).21 The
results in Table 4, however, show no significant interactions for
either competence trust or goodwill trust. While, in addition to the
aforementioned effects of third-party information, results indicate
a positive association between prior experience and the two trust
dimensions, we are unable to find evidence that a firm’s own prior
experience moderates the effect of third-party information on
competence trust or goodwill trust.
According to Hayes (2015), a non-significant interaction in the
above analysis does not imply that the indirect effect of third-party
information on partner selection cannot be moderated by prior
experience. We, therefore, proceed with a formal test of moderated
mediation, as postulated in H9 and H10. The conditional indirect
effects and inferential tests using bootstrapped confidence intervals
are reported in Table 6.
The indirect effect of neutral third-party information on partner
selection through competence trust is positive and significant
when prior experience is absent (0.10; CI [0.01, 0.21]), but not when
it is present (0.05; CI [-0.04, 0.11]). Thus, neutral third-party in-
formation appears to be particularly helpful in forming competence
trusting beliefs when the buyer firm has no prior experience with
the supplier and there are no other cues available to inform partner
selection decisions. Inspection of the index of moderated media-
tion, which is the difference between the conditional indirect ef-
fects (Hayes, 2015), however, yields a non-significant result as the
confidence interval includes zero (0.05; 90% CI [-0.27, 0.07]; unta-
bulated). Based on this, we cannot definitely say that the indirect
effect of neutral-third party information through competence trust
is altered by prior experience. Further, there is no evidence that
favorable third-party information, as compared to neutral third-
party information, indirectly affects partner selection through21 Based on our theory, this applies to neutral and favorable third-party infor-
mation for competence trust, whereas for goodwill trust the effect of neutral third-
party information is not expected and thus mainly relates to the effect of favorable
third-party information. For completeness, we do report all interaction effects,
consistent with the coding systems outlined above.
artner selection in interfirm relationships, Accounting, Organizations
Table 6
Conditional indirect effects.a
Neutral third-party information vs.
Control groupb






Effect SE (boot) Lower Upper Effect SE (boot) Lower Upper Effect SE (boot) Lower Upper
Prior experience absent through competence trust (H9) 0.0965 0.08 0.0114 0.2096 0.0146 0.07 0.0707 0.0900 0.1110 0.08 0.0205 0.2203
through goodwill trust (H10) 0.0362 0.09 0.0561 0.1518 0.0413 0.08 0.0638 0.1399 0.0775 0.09 0.0273 0.2009
Prior experience present through competence trust (H9) 0.0450 0.06 0.0395 0.1114 0.0507 0.08 0.0303 0.1682 0.0957 0.08 0.0052 0.1956
through goodwill trust (H10) 0.0309 0.08 0.1414 0.0536 0.1202 0.10 0.0103 0.2536 0.0893 0.08 0.0016 0.1850
a The conditional indirect effects of third-party information on partner selection and bootstrapping results are produced by Model 7 of the PROCESS Macro based on 10,000
bootstrap samples.
b Represents the effects of neutral third-party information relative to the control condition.
c Represents the effects of favorable third-party information relative to neutral third-party information.
d Represents the effects of favorable third-party information relative to the control condition.
e 80% Confidence Intervals are reported to indicate whether an effect is significant at the 10 percent level (one-tailed).
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control condition, the indirect effect of favorable third-party in-
formation on partner selection through competence trust is sig-
nificant in the absence (0.11; CI [0.02, 0.22]) and in the presence
(0.10; CI [0.01, 0.20]) of prior experience. This observation contra-
dicts the view that third parties are more influential in the absence
of own prior experience and that own prior experience, if available,
would substitute for third-party information. As favorable third-
party information continues to have an impact when prior expe-
rience is present, this indicates that receiving similar consistent
information from different sources is not entirely redundant.
For goodwill trust, we observe that neutral third-party infor-
mation does not affect partner selection, regardless of prior expe-
rience. This is in line with our expectations since third-party
experience, without knowing the outcomes, is not expected to
mitigate managers’ perceptions of relational risk, such that the
mediating effect through goodwill trust does not have grounds to
exist. Notably, the effect of favorable third-party information on
partner selection, as compared to the neutral condition, through
goodwill trust is significant when prior experience is present (0.12;
CI [0.01, 0.25]), but not when it is absent (0.04; CI [-0.06, 0.14]).
Likewise, the effect of favorable third-party information, compared
to the control condition, is close to significance when prior expe-
rience is present, with the bulk of the confidence interval being
above zero (0.09; CI [-0.00, 0.19]), whereas it is not when prior
experience is absent (0.08; CI [-0.03, 0.20]). This reflects a pattern
that is opposite to our expectations, suggesting that, primarily
among those with prior experience, favorable third-party infor-
mation is incorporated in goodwill trust judgments and, subse-
quently, influences partner selection. Intuitively, this finding is
reasonable in that behavioral uncertainties about an unknown
partner could be perceived to be too large to allow for reliance on
third-party information, and that this information only contributes
to goodwill trust once the buyer establishes a baseline of experi-
ence with the supplier. Yet again, the indices of moderated medi-
ation indicate that the differences in indirect effects, in itself, are
not significantly different, not when compared to the neutral third-
party information condition (0.08; 90% CI [-0.10, 0.32]; untabu-
lated) nor to the control condition (0.01; 90% CI [-0.19, 0.20];
untabulated). As such, we cannot conclude that prior experience is
significantly moderating the mediation of favorable third-party
information on partner selection via goodwill trust.
Overall, while the moderated mediation analyses reveal inter-
esting insights, they do not univocally support the proposed sub-
stitutional effects. Based on the above findings, there is no
conclusive evidence that information from own prior experiencePlease cite this article as: Reusen, E.,& Stouthuysen, K., Trust transfer and p
and Society, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2019.101081alters the buyer manager’s response to third-party information in
the partner selection process. Rather, it seems that own firm’s
experience with the partner, combined with third-party informa-
tion, leads to an assessment of the partner’s trustworthiness, and
influences selection decisions accordingly.5. Discussion and conclusion
In this study, we developed theory and provided evidence that
interfirm partnering is affected by a process of trust transfer, in
which managers inform their own trusting beliefs and subsequent
selection decisions based on the actions and experiences of other
firms.
The study contributes to accounting research as it is one of the
first to systematically investigate the effects of third-party infor-
mation in the partner selection process. Extant literature on partner
search and selection has mainly focused on the effects of prior
partner experience at the level of the dyad (e.g., Dekker, 2008;
Dekker & Van den Abbeele, 2010), while we know little about the
role of third parties in the formation of interfirm relationships.
Consistent with the notion of trust transfer, we argue that buyers go
beyond the dyad when assessing the appeal of a potential supplier,
highlighting the value of third parties in that they can diffuse trust-
relevant information. In doing so, our study complements recent
work on trust development and partner selection, pointing out that
potential partners are often evaluated based on external informa-
tion such as their reputation and others’ referral or recommenda-
tions (e.g., Ding et al., 2013; Mahama & Chua, 2016). However, in
addition to the influence that third parties have by sharing their
experiences and releasing information about past performance,
this study implies that themere observation of other firms’ patterns
of ties can elicit trust and influence partner selection.
This study’s contribution further stems from its fine-grained
approach in considering the dimensionality of the trust construct.
Building on prior studies (e.g., Anderson et al., 2017; Dekker et al.,
2013), we do not only provide further evidence on the existence
of competence trust and goodwill trust as two distinct dimensions,
but also demonstrate that the two types of trust are unique in their
sensitivity to information originating from third parties. By
explicitly modeling and measuring these effects, this study con-
tributes to our understanding of how third parties affect partner
selection via shaping specific trusting beliefs. Our mediation model
confirms two trust-based cognitive mechanisms throughwhich the
effect of third-party information on partner selection decisions can
be explained.
Most interestingly, both neutral and favorable third-partyartner selection in interfirm relationships, Accounting, Organizations
E. Reusen, K. Stouthuysen / Accounting, Organizations and Society xxx (xxxx) xxx 15information affect individuals’ trust perceptions towards the sup-
plier, but with differential impact given the particular type of trust
that it elicits. The key difference is that competence trust is con-
cerned with the partner’s ability to perform as expected, not the
intention to do so. A very competent firm may well decide to be
opportunistic and, therefore, managers need to be mindful of the
possibility of a betrayal of trust. If these concerns are at play, one
may not be willing to fully trust, without previous evidence of the
other party’s cooperative intent. In this sense, our observations
resonate with a cautious, rational choice approach to trusting (see
also, Kramer, 1999; Vosselman & Van der Meer-Kooistra, 2009),
where managers do not make exaggerated evaluations of a trusted
party’s trustworthiness based on minimal information. Only when
it is explicitly known that other firms had satisfactory past dealings
with the supplier, this is found to provide sufficient confidence in
the supplier’s good intentions, in addition to its ability to perform.
As such, our results suggest that individuals trust potential sup-
pliers differently depending on the content of available third-party
information, and that competence trust is more readily transferred
across relationships than goodwill trust.
In addition, we investigatewhen third-party information is most
likely to influence the partner selection process by examining the
moderating effect of the focal firm’s own prior experience. Our
expectation was that unfamiliar firms have less information avail-
able from their own experience and thus should paymore attention
to signals fromothers as amain information source. A reduced need
for additional information in the presence of own prior experience
fits well with explanations of earlier studies for the finding that
firms with prior ties invest less time in partner search for new
transactions, referring to a preference for known partners, and
increased familiarity and trust (e.g., Baum et al., 2005; Dekker &
Van den Abbeele, 2010). Yet, while our results support that prior
experience largely contributes to placing trust in the partner, it
does not negate the influence of third-party information. Besides
consulting information from own experience, if available, it turns
out that individuals draw on third parties to inform their trust
judgments and subsequent partner selection decisions.
Understanding the different trust cues attended to in nascent
relationships also has important practical implications. With
improved understanding, these cues can be effectively accounted for
in the partner selection process, from the perspective of the initiating
as well as the target firms. Initiating firms could build information
systems, as to help managers in the assimilation of information
about various aspects of potential partners. Considering the focal
firm’s own prior experience, it is important to make relevant infor-
mation about past interactions accessible to the respective buyer
managers in charge of new collaborations. Given the additional
importance of other firms’ experiences, firms may also want to seek
external validation and proactively collect suggestions from third
parties who are knowledgeable about the partner firm, such that a
more comprehensive evaluation can be made before a partner is
eventually decided on. From the other side, target firms could take
actions or develop strategies that facilitate the transfer of trust. Based
on our findings, it is in the interest of target firms to provide infor-
mation about their partnership history and to advertise themselves
by emphasizing their experience relevant to the objectives of a new
partnership context. Going a step further, they could solicit a testi-
monial from previous partners to act as reviews. In doing so, they
may convince unknown others that they have the appropriate abil-
ities and intentions, in advance of their demonstration of these. And
even if they have shown consistent competent performance and
commitment in earlier working relationships, such third-party en-
dorsements could accentuate existing competence as well as good-
will trusting beliefs and, in turn, positively influence partner
selection decisions for new deals.Please cite this article as: Reusen, E.,& Stouthuysen, K., Trust transfer and p
and Society, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2019.101081While this study reveals interesting findings, it should be
interpreted in the light of its bounded scope and also suggests
several avenues for further research. In the current setting, we only
considered the effect of neutral or positive third-party information.
Also, since the pointed information from own firm’s and other
firms’ experiences are both based on positive experience, they are
complementary by nature. It would be of interest to understand
what happens in the situation where information signals are
inconsistent. The transference of trust may also be dependent on
who the third parties are and how well one knows or trusts the
third-party informants themselves to provide credible information.
We leave investigating this for further research.
Moreover, the present study examines the evaluation of
collaboration partners pertaining only to the partner selection
stage. This perspective limits the depth of understanding of what is
typically a dynamic, ongoing process. A longitudinal approach that
considers different stages of the relationship might provide better
insight into the temporal impact of third-party information.
Another useful extension of this study would be to develop an
experiment inwhich participants play repeated trust games. Such a
design would allow researchers to better track the interplay be-
tween different sources of information and, most importantly, to
observe actual trust transference processes at work.
Consistent with other studies addressing governance in inter-
firm settings, researchers may alsowish to consider the influence of
third-party information on other decisions, besides partner selec-
tion. Whether information regarding third parties’ trustfulness
towards a particular partner also works, for instance, to reduce the
effort put into the contractual management of the relationship
represents an interesting topic for further research.
In conclusion, this study provides preliminary, yet promising
evidence on the role of third parties in trust formation and partner
selection in interfirm relationships. Our moderated mediation
analysis is a first step towards more detailed models of partner
selection. The results underscore the intermediary position of
competence trust and goodwill trust in explaining the relationship
between third-party information and partner selection, at the same
time accounting for the presence of own prior experience. Further
research in this area will be useful to deepen our understanding of
the determinants as well as the implications of trust in interfirm
settings.
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